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Introduction  
This paper adopts the framework of strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam, 2013) to advance 
our understanding of employment service provision in the UK and internationally, in countries where 
these services are increasingly delivered outside the traditional public sector by organisations from 
the third, private and public sector. To date developments in the delivery of employment services 
have been explored within a literature that locates them in international trends towards 
contractualism and managerialism, inspired by New Public Management (NPM) (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997; Ramia and Carney, 2000). Internationally, reforms have involved the adoption of 
quasi-markets in the delivery of welfare to work programmes. These reforms are, informed partly by 
critiques of public sector bureaucracies and partly by aspirations that competing, non-statutory 
providers will drive up performance efficiency, flexibility and innovation (Van Berkel and van der Aa, 
2005; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Considine et al, 2011). This has meshed with the reconfiguration 
of ǁelfaƌe ƌeĐipieŶts fƌoŵ ͚passiǀe͛ to ͚aĐtiǀe͛ participants via labour market activation policies, 
enshrining greater individual responsibility through greater conditionality (Dwyer 2004; Peck, 2001). 
In the UK the evolution of the employment services field culminated in the introduction of the Work 
Programme by the incoming Coalition government in 2011. The programme, replacing a range of 
existing schemes, involved central government contracting with ͚Pƌiŵe͛ pƌoǀideƌs who in turn 
subcontract to other providers, creating a web of contractual relationships across the private, third 
and public sectors.  
However, much of the existing literature on the development and implementation of employment 
services has shied away from a more theoretical account of how welfare to work operates as an 
industry: a distinct quasi-market in which the state plays a central role. Much of the available 
research originates in programme evaluations, which rarely distinguish between different providers 
(Damm, 2012). More critical scholarly accounts have tended to portray providers as either powerless 
victims of Government policy (Aiken and Bode, 2009, Baring Panel, 2012), or largely uncritical 
accomplices of the neo-liberal agenda (Davies, 2008, Wright et al 2011). These echo a wider third 
sector literature which has often examined the ways in which service providers are co-opted into the 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ageŶda aŶd suďjeĐt to isoŵoƌphiĐ pƌessuƌes (Carmel and Harlock, 2008). While not 
disputing the relevance of state agency and structural phenomena, it is argued here that the goals, 
strategies and choices of providers are also clearly relevant but so far under-examined. Accounts 
struggle to explain the variation in the experiences of providers, based on their position, role and 
level of power and resources. Where accounts have differentiated between providers they almost 
always privilege the notion of separate and distinctive public, private and third sectors and variation 
between providers in the same sector is played down (see WPC, 2011).  
This article argues that developments in the structure of the employment services market, and in 
particular the rupture caused by the introduction of the Work Programme in the UK, raise crucial 
questions about the way a broad spectrum of providers deliver services. Specifically, these questions 
concern the (power) relationships between providers and state actors, and the agency of providers 
to shape and respond to their quasi-market environment. In turn, they demand a more theoretically 
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informed account of how organisations operate strategically and in dynamic relationship with one 
another. Drawing on empirical data from a study of the early period of the UK Work Programme 
(Rees et al. 2013), this article uses employment services as a test case for applying a theoretical 
framework derived from Fligstein and McAdaŵ͛s notion of strategic action fields in order to address 
issues of strategy, change and power relations amongst providers (2012). We argue that the notion 
of fields – a spatial metaphor for domains where actors vie for power and advantage– sheds light on 
the dynamic and contested nature of the roles and relationships between providers and their 
strategic engagement with, and interpretation of, developments in the employment services field. In 
so doing the paper makes a significant contribution to two literatures. First, we advance 
understanding of employment services by anchoring it in a theoretical framework that allows us to 
explore how providers operate, strategize and maintain their position in a quasi-market operated by 
state actors. In doing so we provide a theoretically informed account of employment service 
provision that has much wider relevance to an international literature on employment services, 
activation policy and welfare delivery more generally. Second, by applying the notion of strategic 
action fields to the cases of employment services and the UK Work Programme we contribute to the 
development of field theory as developed by Fligstein and McAdam. Empirically testing these cases 
enables us to highlight the substantial utility of their account but also enriches and strengthens it.  
The article proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief description of the empirical research and the 
methodology employed. This is followed by an account of the key tenets of Fligstein and McAdam͛s 
theoretical framework clarifying how and why employment services and the Work Programme might 
be constituted as strategic action fields and how providers might be actors in those fields. We then 
deploy FligsteiŶ aŶd MĐAdaŵ͛s ŶotioŶ of ͚episodes of ĐoŶteŶtioŶ͛ to outline the dynamic nature of 
the employment services field in the UK over recent years, culminating in the commissioning of the 
Work Programme. The empirical evidence is then explored in more depth as we examine how, in the 
context of the commissioning of a new programme, providers with different levels of resources and 
from different sectors interpreted the implications for their position in the field and deployed 
strategies to improve on or maintain that position. Our discussion section then critically engages 
with our specific contributions to the two literatures; field theory and employment services.  
Methods and data  
The study on which this article draws, part of a wider programme of research on service delivery by 
third sector organisations, sought to understand the roles played by providers from different sectors 
in the Work Programme. The research was undertaken with the aim of exploring the sector-based 
rhetoric surrounding the commissioning and early implementation phases of the programme 
particularly in light of media reporting that third sector providers were being marginalised in favour 
of corporate interests (Butler 2011). Resting on an earlier evidence review by one of the team 
(Damm 2012) the methodology for the study consisted of two elements; key informant interviews 
informed an exploration of provider experiences  in two localities (Rees et al. 2013). The 8 key 
informant interviews included respondents from third sector and employment services 
infrastructure organisations; private and third sector Prime contractor organisations, and mainly 
large national third sector organisations delivering the Work Programme. The two areas chosen as 
the location for an exploration of provider experiences were selected to provide geographical and 
labour market diversity (inner-city versus semi-rural, north versus south east) and different supply 
ĐhaiŶ ŵodels. IŶ eaĐh aƌea a ͚ŵappiŶg͛ eǆeƌĐise ideŶtified the ƌole and type of organisations in the 
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supply chains. A phone survey of these providers (approximately 65% were successfully contacted) 
ascertained their sector, supply chain position, and the nature of their provision. This enabled us to 
describe the types of organisations involved and what they were delivering, and to understand 
different supply chain relationships. The final element of this stage involved semi structured 
interviews with 4 of the 5 private sector Primes operating in the two sampled areas (the fifth 
declined to take part) and 14 subcontracted providers of whom 10 were third sector, 3 were private 
sector and 1 was public sector. Providers were asked about their previous experience of 
employment services, motivations for bidding for the Work Programme, experiences of the 
commissioning process and early stages of delivery and their views on sector differences in provider 
experiences of the programme. 
Field theory and employment services  
A tradition of multi-disciplinary scholarship has led to a development of the concept of field to 
understand individual-level and organisational social worlds. It draws much from social theory and 
particularly Bouƌdieu͛s ĐoŶĐeptual triad of fields, habitus and capital which focused on the way 
individuals negotiate and utilise resources to position themselves in relation to others (Bourdieu, 
1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). DiMaggio aŶd Poǁell͛s ;ϭϵϴϯͿ fouŶdatioŶal ǁoƌk began with 
the observation of organizational fields structured by state funders shaping the responses and 
strategies of organisations. In the decades since, field theory has reached a level of maturity as a 
theoretical lens drawing on traditions in organisational studies, social movement studies and new 
institutional theory, and now provides a sophisticated way to frame the relationships between 
organisations, institutions and other actors (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Scott and Meyer 1983). 
Building on this work Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have more recently set out a general theory of 
fields to better account for stability and change in collective social life. Their concept of a strategic 
action field can be defined as a meso-level social order (a grouping of individuals, organisations and 
institutions) within which actors maintain a common set of understandings about the positions, 
hierarchies and the rules for what behaviour is legitimate, conceivable, and ͚ŵakes seŶse͛. Actors 
aƌe iŶ ĐoŶstaŶt ĐoŵpetitioŶ, ͚joĐkeǇiŶg͛ foƌ the stƌoŶgest possiďle positioŶ ǁithiŶ theiƌ field. 
Importantly fields are not isolated units. Each strategic action field is, they argue, embedded in a 
wider environment of fields in various relationships with one another; some close or proximate with 
adjoining borders or nested within one another like a Russian doll, some more distant (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012). Fields as the building blocks of social, political and economic life thus exist in a web 
of interconnections and relationships with other fields; relationships that may be dependent and 
hierarchical or interdependent and reciprocal. (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012 p58) 
We argue that employment services in the UK can be characterised as a strategic action field 
constituted by a diverse range of actors; providers of various sizes, sectors and interests, who are 
involved in the delivery of support to unemployed people. These providers jostle with one another 
for position, power and resources in the field which is primarily funded via contracts for delivering 
government employment programmes but where commercial and charitable resources are also 
drawn on by many. This field, we suggest, sits alongside a range of other public service delivery fields 
such as criminal justice and social care and in close and dependent relationship with the state field 
and state actors. The state may in different ways intervene in the operation of service delivery fields, 
potentially mediating and disrupting relationships through reforming policies, reallocating resources 
and in some cases commissioning and managing quasi-markets for service delivery. In employment 
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services in the UK much of the field is governed by a large state actor, the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), a central government department that manages a broad spectrum (although not 
all) of employment service provision. Some of the delivery of that provision is devolved to statutory 
Job Centre Plus (JCP) offices across the country. The rest is delivered through the design, 
commissioning and arms-length management of individual employment programmes operated by 
contracted providers from the third, private and other parts of the public sector. If employment 
services in the UK can be conceived of as a strategic action field so too can individual programmes 
such as the Work Programme, each of which is effectively a managed quasi-market within which 
DWP controls the nature of provision, distribution of resources, and the roles of providers. The Work 
Programme is, we argue, effectively a strategic action field nested inside the wider employment 
services field, constituted by a particular group of contracted providers and a particular set of rules.  
To return to Fligstein and McAdam the key strength of their framework is that it suggests a dynamic 
notion of fields as continually in flux and often subject to periods of contention, unsettlement and 
͞ƌoutiŶe, ƌolliŶg tuƌďuleŶĐe͟ ;ϮϬϭ2, 19), more rarely crisis, as well as periods of relative stability. In 
part that dynamism is a product of the agency of field actors jostling for position and attempting to 
shape the rules of the game, promote their interests and ensure their access to resources. Power 
dynamics between actors are located through the positions of incumbents and challengers. The 
former haǀe a gƌeateƌ shaƌe of the field͛s ƌesouƌĐes aŶd thus greater control over field rules and 
symbolic meanings that help to support their interests. To this end they tend to have particular sway 
with the field͛s governance units, essentially bodies charged with overseeing compliance with field 
rules who almost always support the dominant (incumbent-friendly) logic of the field. Challengers on 
the other hand haǀe less iŶflueŶĐe oǀeƌ the field͛s opeƌatioŶ; they recognise the nature of the field, 
comply grudgingly with the status quo, and seek opportunities to redefine the field to their own 
advantage. Most of the time they take what the system gives them, while waiting for opportunities 
to promote their preferred logic. In the employment services field we can identify how providers in 
the field have different levels of power, resources and interest in the field which serve to align them 
with incumbent or challenger roles. We argue that large prime contractors and those holding 
multiple contracts aƌe the iŶĐuŵďeŶts siŶĐe theǇ ƌeĐeiǀe the lioŶ͛s shaƌe of the ƌesouƌĐes and have 
more voice in debates about the nature and role of the field. Challengers are those further down the 
supply chain: smaller less well-resourced providers ǁith a sŵalleƌ ͚shaƌe͛ of the Ƌuasi-market who 
might be seeking a more powerful position through strategic development.  
Change within fields comes not only from internal contention but also from external or exogenous 
shocks. Fligstein and McAdam describe ͞destabilizing change processes that develop within 
proximate state or non-state fields͟ (2012, 3) sending ripples out. Where there are strong 
dependent relationships these might interrupt the flow of resources essential to incumbent 
advantage, undermine the legitimating ideas on which the field rests or involve the movement or 
͚iŶǀasioŶ͛ of aĐtoƌs from other fields. The result can be a crisis, or more usually an episode of 
contention, marked by a shared sense of uncertainty regarding the (new or unsettled) rules and 
power relations within the field. These episodes may play out as a period of sustained contentious 
interaction as challengers and incumbents alike mobilise to advance their interests. Often 
incumbents will be able to resist any resulting pressure by cultivating support from governance units 
and state actors who may impose a settlement in favour of the incumbents. In rare cases, however, 
challengers may be able to redefine the field with new rules, power relationships and logics or 
frames. In order to understand how actors influence others and legitimise their view of the field 
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Fligstein and Mcadam draw on the notion of social skill. Skilled social actors, they argue, engage in 
the task of framing a paƌtiĐulaƌ ͚stoƌǇ͛ oƌ ǀieǁ of the field aŶd theiƌ positioŶ ǁithiŶ it. Incumbents 
and challengers alike will utilise frames of reference to make sense of the field although these 
frames will often be oppositional.  
The remainder of this article draws on our qualitative data to understand the dynamic nature of the 
UK employment services field with a particular focus on the commissioning of the Work Programme. 
In the sections that follow we look firstly at the ͚ƌolliŶg tuƌďuleŶĐe͛ and ͚episodes of contention͛ that 
have characterised the evolution of the employment services field over recent years and argue that 
in 2010/11 DWP͛s rapid commissioning and then implementation of the Work Programme created 
an episode of contention for employment services providers. We then explore how in practice, 
providers navigated this episode, made sense of shifting challenger and incumbent roles in the field 
and developed strategic responses, re-orientated services and shifted frames of reference in order 
to secure   position and resources in the Work Programme field.  
Episodes of contention in the employment services field 
Phase 1 –  1997-2006 The proliferation of contracted providers in an emergent field 
Prior to 1997 when the New Labour government came to power the majority of employment 
services were provided by the public sector Job Centres, although some contracted elements of 
provision and support for unemployed groups also took place less formally in third sector 
organisations working with particular groups. From 1997 onwards substantial policy shifts promoted 
the expansion of services through contracting to third and private sector providers, legitimised by a 
dominant logic in which private sector were seen to bring efficiency and economies of scale, whilst 
the third sector was seen to offer ͚speĐialist͛ pƌoǀisioŶ foƌ (harder to reach) groups with particular 
sets of needs.  The range of contracted programmes grew from small scale pilots in the late 1990s to 
large national schemes in the 2000s, leading to a proliferation of pilots and programmes aimed at a 
wide range of different customer groups (e.g. the New Deals programmes aimed at, for instance, 
disabled people, the long term unemployed and lone parents) or support to jobseekers in particular 
types of neighbourhood (e.g. Employment Zones) that buttressed existing state provision in local Job 
Centres. This expansion of opportunities for non-state organisations to deliver services on a 
significant scale (Damm 2012) created an emergent if turbulent strategic action field of employment 
services outside, but closely aligned with, the state apparatus, constituted by providers from the 
third and private sector delivering a diverse range of services to different groups. Arguably the third 
sector͛s position in this field was cemented by the focus on programmes tailored to defined 
customer groups which dovetailed with its reputation for specialist provision. 
Phase 2 2007-2010 The consolidation of the field  
The second phase in the field͛s history occurred following DWP͛s introduction of the ͚supplǇ ĐhaiŶ͛ 
model in the mid 2000s resulting in (as intended), a consolidation of the private sector share of 
contracted provision thƌough laƌgeƌ ͚Pƌiŵe͛ ĐoŶtƌaĐts (Mcdonald et al., 2007). This phase also saw 
DWP embrace a model of commissioning that sought to rationalise prime contracts and increase the 
degree to which payments to providers were linked to employment outcomes promising a reduction 
in administrative burden, inefficiency and a transfer of risk to external organisations (Freud, 2007; 
Davies, 2008).  For providers in the field these proposals and the subsequent programme that 
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emerged (The Flexible New Deal (FND)) signalled  ongoing turbulence and contention with a shift 
towards outcomes based contracts, and increasing provider autonomy over services  (see also 
Mythen et al., 2012).  The increased financial risk to would-be providers also meant greater 
opportunity for profit. By the end of this period, the strategic action field of employment services 
had reached a significant level of maturity. As a field it was dominated by the evolution of DWP 
policy and programme design but incumbents had also established and supported a number of 
internal governance units such as the Employment and Related Services Association (ERSA) a trade 
association and policy-making intermediary with government; and field-specific think tank the 
Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI) that runs conferences and produces analysis and 
policy recommendations. Both were colonised by powerful incumbent providers, had close links to 
DWP and helped to produce legitimacy and authority for and within the field  
Phase 3 2010- present - Contraction of the field; the Work Programme 
In 2010 the field received a substantial exogenous shock following the formation of a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government explicit in their aim of reforming welfare, particularly in light 
of deficit reduction measures following the 2008/9 recession. The DWP quickly set about designing 
and commissioning a new employment scheme that would replace a number of programmes in a 
relatively short time frame (NAO, 2012). The Work Programme involved incremental developments 
from previous programme models which amounted to substantial changes to the roles and 
resources available to providers and in doing so gave rise to an episode of contention in the field.  
Firstly the programme involved larger ͚Pƌiŵe͛ contracts than previous programmes (Lane et al., 
2013) with two to three Primes managing a supply chain of subcontractors in large regional areas 
across the UK. The Primes would either act as delivery agencies offering ͚eŶd to eŶd͛ suppoƌt to 
move participants from unemployment into sustained work or they would subcontract some or all of 
this end-to-end support to a Tier One sub-contractor (see Figure 1). Where a participant required 
more targeted interventions, (for example for mental health or drugs and alcohol problems), Primes 
and their end-to-end suppliers could subcontract for additional support from specialist providers 
forming a Tier Two in the supply chain. Only Primes have any contractual relationship with DWP, Tier 
One and Tier Two providers contract with the Primes.  
The second important developmental feature of the programme was that the ͚paǇŵeŶt ďǇ ƌesults͛ 
(PBR) financing model involved a significantly more ͚ďaĐk eŶded͛ paǇŵeŶt stƌuĐtuƌe than previous 
programmes. Most payments were triggered when a participant had remained in employment for 
around 24 months, substantially increasing the financial risk to providers. The third important 
feature was that the programme catered to a broader range of participants than previous 
programmes, in particular those on disability related benefits who had previously been served by 
specialist programmes. Primes were given only minimal service requirements so they could choose 
their own methods and tailor or personalise support to a wide variety of needs regardless of a 
participants formal benefit category (Newton et al., 2012) including subcontracting to Tier Two 
specialists. This development, part of a trend towards personalisation in employment services 
(Borghi and van Berkel, 2007; Toerien et al., 2013) marked a shift for providers in the field who in 
previous phases had delivered predefined services to participant groups within specialist 
programmes.   
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Taken together we argue that the commissioning of the Work Programme produced a sizable shift in 
the resources, rewards and relationships within the employment services field. It increased the 
financial risks for potential providers and shifted the emphasis towards large scale geographically 
defined generic services tailored to meet the needs of a very broad range of participants.  The result 
from a fields perspectives was an episode of contention in the employment services field as 
providers sought to understand the implications of these changes for them, their position and stake 
in the field and ability to compete for contracts. In the next section we examine how different 
providers navigated the new roles, relationships and hierarchies and were able to deploy strategies 
to maintain or strengthen their position in the field.   
Provider strategies in the employment services field  
Interview data from providers of different sectors, sizes and supply chain positions highlighted 
considerable diversity in how they understood the risks and rewards of the new Work Programme 
field and navigated the commissioning process.  Depending on how organisations were positioned in 
the employment services field they either saw bidding for the Work Programme as a choice or a 
necessity. This highlights the interconnections inherent in the nested nature of the two fields. As a 
single scheme replacing multiple programmes in the context of a wider financial squeeze on public 
spending the work programme was regarded by providers as one of the only sources of funding in 
the employment services field. The programme was referred to as ͚the oŶlǇ gaŵe iŶ toǁŶ͛, and 
several providers described feeling under pressure to secure some form of involvement if they were 
to ƌeŵaiŶ ͚in the game͛; i.e. to maintain their position in the field. For example a provider 
specialising in employment and language support for ethnic minority groups had been involved in a 
number of previous programmes and described their response to the Work Programme 
commissioning and decision to approach a Prime: ͞we had no choice basically ďeĐause if Ǉou didŶ͛t 
go with them [the Prime] theŶ… Ǉou doŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇthiŶg͟  Third Sector Tier Two provider 17.  
DWP played a central role shaping the employment services field by designing the work programme 
model and commissioning the Prime contractors. Providers differed in the degree to which they 
understood the new model, in particular  the risks and rewards associated with different tiers of 
involvement in the supply chains. At the Prime level the risks involved in holding a contract and the 
financial capacity required to bid meant such contracts were not viable for many of the existing 
providers in the field even those with previous experience of operating prime contracts (Work and 
Pensions Select Committee, 2011). Third sector organisations recognised they had less opportunity 
to raise capital borrowing from banks or investors and fewer reserves or assets that would enable 
them to absorb these risks.  A number questioned other facets of the Prime role particularly the 
requirement for sanctioning participants which they saw as contrary to their mission.  Some 
providers, who were in a relatively secure incumbent role, realised that with Prime contracts out of 
reach they would struggle to maintain that position in the field. At the same time large, mostly 
private sector companies from other proximate fields or other countries saw the Prime contracts as 
an opportunity to move into a new field. These ͚iŶǀadeƌs͛, ǁell eŶdoǁed ǁith fiŶancial resources 
and experience of managing supply chains in other fields viewed the new contract sizes as more 
profitable, making UK employment services a viable field to colonise. One successful Prime new to 
the field recalled looking at the Work Programme model and making a decision to ͞do this in a big 
ǁaǇ oƌ ǁe doŶ͛t do it at all͟ Prime 11. Their strategy in gaining entry to the field was to gain 
substantial market share, immediate incumbency, and there is evidence some achieved this through 
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a practice of undercutting DWP͛s suggested payment structures during the bidding stage in order to 
win more contracts (Simmonds, 2011). Whilst invader Primes moved directly into incumbent roles in 
the Work Programme field others who had been Primes in previous programmes found themselves 
moved down the supply chain and into more of a challenger role. This group were more critical in 
their framing of the programme model, for example expressing doubts that those who had 
discounted heavily could offer a viable service. 
The assessment of risks and rewards for actors in the field was also taking place for potential Tier 
One contractors. Since end-to-end roles offered service contracts with Primes which specified 
market share and predicted a certain flow of customers over a given period they were recognised by 
some providers to be relatively secure and financially viable. However they favoured providers who 
could provide generic employment support to a wide range of customers across a relatively large 
geographical area. In addition providers hoping to secure one of these end to end contracts had to 
negotiate not with DWP but with an array of mostly private sector potential Prime contractors. 
These negotiations revolved around prospective end-to-end providers selling their services to 
prospective Primes and prospective Primes assessing which end to end providers had the capacity to 
operate a contract of the required size, volume of customers and geographical coverage.. Incumbent 
third sector providers whilst keen to be involved in end-to-end delivery (in order to stay in the field) 
were also worried about the implications of the ͚step ĐhaŶge͛ of taking mandated participants. 
Several noted that this was contrary to their mission statement and had struggled to resolve these 
tensions internally in order that they could bid. ͞That͛s ǁheƌe a lot of the ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aŶd the 
conversations went, you know, internally as a third sector organisation do we want to be part of 
that?͟ Third sector Tier One provider 26.  
However end-to-end contracts were not an option for all providers. Smaller local providers and third 
sector providers with a specialism related to supporting a particular hard to reach group had little 
capacity to bid for end-to-end contracts and found they were being channelled into Tier Two 
positions in Primes͛ supply chains. Some providers noted that these roles were being offered on a 
more tenuous ͚spot-puƌĐhase͛, or Service Level Agreements (SLA) type arrangement which gave no 
guarantee of flows or referrals of programme participants and thus any income from the 
programme. As this group of providers negotiated with primes in their area, some lobbying hard for 
their particular specialism to be included, they found considerable pressure on price for specialist 
services that made even a service level agreement untenable for them. One provider described how 
they were asked by the Prime to give a cost per learner for the English courses they provided that 
ǁas ͚Ŷot too high͛ and when they did ǁeƌe ƋuiĐklǇ told it ǁas too eǆpeŶsiǀe. ͞they kept saying that: 
͚too expensive͛͟  Third sector Tier Two provider 17. Whilst some of these smaller specialist providers 
had many years of experience in the employment services field the only positions available to them 
in the new Work Programme field were in Tier Two roles that offered little financial reward and gave 
them little bargaining power or influence. Some in this group adopted a challenger frame of 
reference, forming consortia and asserting that without their contribution the programme was not 
helping the hardest to reach. However more often Tier Twos appeared to move into a marginal role 
in the field not wanting to complain about their position in case it jeopardised potential referrals in 
the future and it would be difficult to label them as challengers. 
For the larger providers hoping to obtain a Tier One role strategies also differed widely. The 
increasing importance of being able to offer generic end-to-end support rather than specialist 
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provision was something some providers had noted not only in the relation to Work Programme but 
in other recent supply chain programmes. Several had strategically sought to re-orientate their 
services to make them more generic in order to bolster their position in the field and their capacity 
to win contracts.  One organisation with a disability remit who had delivered on a previous disability 
focused programmes described a process of broadening out the types of clients they worked with to 
include lone parents and those with mental health problems. They saw this strategy as central to 
their success in securing an end-to-end contract in the Work Programme. This re-orienting of 
services also happened in the private sector. Whilst private sector providers tended to have a 
background in the recruitment or training fields and were more likely to be offering generic services 
anyway, some described similar pressure to broaden out their remit in order to stay in the market. 
One end-to-end provider with a training background explained that they had realised their specialist 
IT industry training focus meant ͚we were alǁaǇs peŶalised͛. They acquired a smaller generalist 
employment training company that would enable them to offer generic geographical coverage in 
order to enhance their position in the Work Programme. ͞BǇ ďuǇiŶg [ǆǆ] TƌaiŶiŶg, it͛s ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ, 
theƌe's Ŷo ƋuestioŶ [foƌ the Pƌiŵe] aďout, ͚is this the ƌight pƌoǀideƌ͛?  It͛s generic Welfare to Work 
provision.͟  Private sector Tier One provider 25.  
However reorienting services to become generic providers also required some substantial framing 
on the part of organisations to legitimise their changing role and position in the field. Private sector 
organisations were able to frame these shifts in terms of securing financial position or market share 
but third sector organisations were more restricted since they needed to  frame their services with 
reference to their mission and client group.  The disability provider mentioned above had effectively 
framed their move to generalist provision as a way for them to continue to serve their main client 
group. They argued that not being in the Work Programme would mean their services would not be 
available to people with particular needs (their main client groups) who would be referred as part of 
the general Work Programme client groups. ͞“o eǀeŶ though Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t ĐoŶtƌol ǁho͛s ĐoŵiŶg 
through the door, there'll be lots of people who benefit from [our service] aŶd ǁe͛ll haǀe disaďled 
people, people with mental health issues, whatever.͟  Third sector Tier One provider 26 
For other third sector organisations, re-orientating services away from the beneficiary groups named 
in an oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s mission was not deemed an appropriate strategy by trustees or senior 
management; it was understood negatively as mission drift. Despite being incumbents in previous 
programmes some third sector providers had chosen to continue to operate as specialists in order 
not to compromise their mission despite the fact this weakened their position in the field. One large 
national organisation supporting those with a particular disability had rejected a strategy of 
attempting to secure an end-to-end contract and opted instead for Tier Two involvement so that 
they could focus on serving their (low incidence, widely dispersed) client group. Whilst this forced 
them into more of a challenger role than they were used to they argued they could maintain their 
power in other ways by lobbying DWP and participating in the operation of governance units within 
the field.   
Even when no actual reorientation of services had gone on some providers still found it necessary to 
shift their frame of reference - the story they told about themselves - so that they could legitimise 
their services in the new Work Programme field. For example there was an assumption by some 
Primes that third sector organisations must be specialist providers. This was problematic for third 
sector organisations seeking to obtain coveted end-to-end contracts. A large local provider with a 
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long history of providing generic employment support in their area and looking to secure an end-to-
end contract recalled having to work hard during the commissioning process to distance themselves 
from the conflation of ͚third sector͛ with ͚specialist͛. ͞[Primes] used to say to me, what's your 
speciality?  I'd say, end-to-end.͟ TSO Tier One provider 24. Of course there was also a large swathe of 
small specialist providers from the third and private sector who had little option of diversifying or 
reorienting their provision even if they had wanted to they did not have the financial capacity and 
some had little awareness of the implications of a Tier Two contract in any case. These providers͛ 
strategies mainly involved ensuring their organisations were listed by the primes as specialist 
providers in the hope that this would lead to referrals. 
The Work Programmes͛ supply chain structure, generalist/personalised delivery and PBR financing 
model are all central factors in defining a new set of rewards, roles and relationships in the 
employment services field. Provider strategies in relation to securing positions in the field or opting 
not to (re)enter were differentiated according to the resources, experience, size and sector of the 
organisation and these in turn shaped which level in the supply chain they aimed for and whether 
they were successful in securing a contract.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
This article has aimed to make a significant contribution to two distinct areas of social scientific 
endeavour: the policy and practice focused literature on employment services and welfare to work, 
and the development of a theory of fields as outlined by Fligstein and McAdam. Applying field theory 
to employment services and the UK͛s Work Programme has highlighted a number of core insights. 
Firstly we have shown that employment services and individual programmes are interlinked and 
nested strategic action fields where providers jostle for position and legitimacy, where what 
happens in one directly impacts on the others and where the state in the form of the DWP is a 
central player in defining and legitimising field positions. We argued that the broad field of 
employment services has undergone a number of phases in its development as a result of ongoing 
policy development and shifts in the funding model of programmes. These have substantially 
changed roles and relationships between actors in the field. Recognising these is a crucial way to 
understand the dynamic nature of fields, seeing them not simply as containers of organisations 
responding to policy agendas but as constituted by active agents operating strategically in relation to 
each other and their environment. Specifically we showed how the Work Programme commissioning 
process disturbed existing provider positions in the field with the supply chain model creating new 
iŶĐuŵďeŶt ƌoles foƌ ͚iŶǀadeƌ͛ Pƌiŵes fƌoŵ otheƌ fields aŶd ŵaƌgiŶalising the position of specialist 
providers – many of whom had a long history of providing employment services in the field.  In other 
words the shifting role and positions of different providers has longer term implications for the 
constituent actors in the employment services field. 
 
We believe the most significant insight into the workings of the employment services field provided 
by our application of field theory is the notion that providers are not simply interchangeable pawns 
deployed to implement government policy agendas. Instead we are alerted to the differentiation 
and strategic action (agency) of providers within the field. Providers, we have argued, are a diverse 
group of organisations with varying financial resources, experience in the field, missions and ethos, 
voice and power. These characteristics make them more or less effective in their ability to strategize 
in relation to the new rules of the game during an episode of contention. For example we showed 
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how some specialist providers strategically re-orientated their services to become generic providers 
both in practice and in terms of the way they framed their services as a way to ensure their 
continued position in the field. However some providers were less aware of the nature of changes to 
the rules of the game governing the field, others did not have the resources to re-orientate their 
services and still others were unwilling to make changes that might undermine their mission. One of 
our starting points for the research was a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁith the ǁaǇ ͚seĐtoƌ͛ has been deployed in a 
reductionist way to understand provider differences. Instead, field theory has helped us highlight 
that sector is only one category amongst many which intersect to determine organisations͛ position 
in the field. 
At the same time we have shown how the UK Employment services case is important for testing, and 
extending FligsteiŶ aŶd MaĐadaŵ͛s theoƌǇ of stƌategiĐ aĐtioŶ fields. Theiƌ ĐoŶĐeptual fƌaŵeǁoƌk 
proposes that dynamic relationships and change are endemic features of fields. Examining 
employment services an emergent field experiencing an episode of contention has shed light on the 
multiple and oppositional dimensions to actor͛s strategies, positions and interests that intersect to 
create a particular configuration of field dynamics.  Of course not all the elements of their theory are 
unproblematic when applied in this case. The concepts of challengers and incumbents for example 
are very broad and whilst this makes them widely applicable to different field cases they do not 
comfortably account for the complexity of field-based hierarchies of position in employment 
services. Our initial interpretation was that incumbent roles were held by well-resourced Primes and 
larger end-to-end providers with longevity in the field, numerous Work Programme contracts and 
prominent roles in the governance units; smaller specialist providers inhabiting Tier Two positions in 
the supply chain were in a challenger position. However there are numerous providers that do not 
fit neatly into either position.  Several invading primes from other fields apparently moved directly 
into powerful incumbent positions and there were local organisations with only a single Tier One 
contract appeaƌiŶg to ͚puŶĐh aďoǀe theiƌ ǁeight͛, including occupying key roles in governance units. 
Similarly there were providers who might be defined as challengers but despite a relatively 
longstanding position in the field sat on the margins, involved but un-strategic and certainly not 
challenging dominant rules which did not serve their interests within the field. In other words they 
were challengers who did not challenge. Ultimately the diversity of providers militated against an 
overly simplistic attribution of challenger and incumbent roles which might more usefully be 
acknowledged to be internally differentiated.  
This raises a second issue we have alluded to in the empirical analysis: how to account for the 
diffeƌeŶt leǀels of ͚iŶteƌest͛ appaƌeŶt aŵoŶgst the pƌoǀideƌs iŶ the field? A swath of providers in all 
tiers of the supply chain straddled the employment services field and another or several proximate 
fields; a situation which appeared to reduce their resource dependency and make them less reliant 
upon or ͚tied iŶto͛ the field. Some were relatively large organisations from the private and third 
sector for whom the Work Programme was a ͚side-line͛ to their main business. These providers were 
less depeŶdeŶt aŶd less ͚iŶteƌested͛ iŶ the pƌogƌaŵŵe – they aimed to participate in the 
employment services field but Ŷot ͚at aŶǇ Đost͛. This mediated their position as incumbents or 
challengers in the field. Whilst most had been operating successfully in the field for a number of 
years their organisation was not wholly dependent on field resources and legitimacy.  
Our final analytical insight has been that, as a quasi-market in which the state in the form of DWP 
plays a central role in defining positions and controlling the flow of resources, the Work Programme 
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is a very particular type of strategic action field. In Fligstein and McAdaŵ͛s ŵodel the state is 
effectively a separate (proximate) field. Whilst it has power to define roles, direct resources and 
legitimise practice, field incumbents are also seen to have considerable autonomy to set these 
understandings and positions. In reality, the Work Programme͛s Ƌuasi-market design makes the 
state sole commissioner; in order to guarantee incumbent status organisations must prioritise the 
lobbying of decision-makers in the state field in order to shape the design of programmes to serve 
their best advantage. Even then change in political leadership can cause ruptures in this process. Yet 
this relationship is not static since once the commissioning is over DWPs role is reduced and much of 
the power shifts to the Primes who now control the subcontracted providers in their supply chains. 
 
Finally we want to emphasise that this article constitutes a pioneering analytical venture in the 
application of field theory to employment services. Employment services is a highly complex set of 
fields and issues; similarly field theory is a dense and richly rewarding theoretical framework. We 
have highlighted the value of this analytical dialogue but many questions remain for scholars in the 
future. Relationships between proximate and nested fields require further attention: for example 
how does the work programme interact with other forms of employment support in the 
employment services field? Whilst we were able to hypothesise about the relationship between the 
field and the state we did not interview state actors and could not shed light on the nuance of this 
relationship or unpack the workings of a quasi-market from the perspective of those actors. Also of 
interest would be the relationship between employment services and other proximate service 
delivery fields particularly where there are many organisations straddling field boundaries. There is 
much more work to be done in applying a theory of fields not only to employment services but to a 
wide range of other service delivery and other interconnected fields.  
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